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THE CASE FOR THE
THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
Orin S. Kerr*
This Article offers a defense of the Fourth Amendment's third-
party doctrine, the controversial rule that information loses
Fourth Amendment protection when it is knowingly revealed to a
third party. Fourth Amendment scholars have repeatedly attacked
the rule on the ground that it is unpersuasive on its face and gives
the government too much power This Article responds that critics
have overlooked the benefits of the rule and have overstated its
weaknesses.
The third-party doctrine serves two critical functions. First, the
doctrine ensures the technological neutrality of the Fourth
Amendment. It corrects for the substitution effect of third parties
that would otherwise allow savvy criminals to substitute a hidden
third-party exchange for a previously public act. Second, the doc-
trine helps ensure the clarity of Fourth Amendment rules. It
matches the Fourth Amendment rules for information to the rules
for location, creating clarity without the need for a complex
framework of sui generis rules.
Finally, the two primary criticisms of the third-party doctrine are
significantly weaker than critics have claimed. The third-party
doctrine is awkward for reasons of form rather than function; it is
a consent rule disguised as an application of Katz's "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. Claims that the doctrine gives the
government too much power overlook the substitutes for Fourth
Amendment protection in the use of the third parties. Those substi-
tutes include entrapment law, common law privileges, the Massiah
doctrine, the First Amendment, internal agency regulations, and
the rights of the third parties themselves.
* Professor, George Washington University Law School. This Article benefited greatly
from thoughtful comments during workshops at Seton Hall, Widener-Wilmington, and the
GW/Berkeley Privacy Law Scholars Conference. Thanks in particular to Daniel Solove, Christopher
Slobogin, David Feige, Stephen Henderson, and Christine Jolls.
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INTRODUCTION
Human beings are social animals. We like to share. We like to gossip.
We ask for help from others, and we give help in return. Sometimes we
share by speaking in person. Sometimes we write a letter or send a message
by computer. In all of these cases, the human impulse to share creates an
important opportunity for criminal investigators. When wrongdoers share
with others, they often expose evidence of their crimes. A corrupt
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businessman might disclose records to his accountant. A mob boss might tell
his brother about an assault. A drug dealer might reveal his plans to a
confidential informant. In all of these cases, someone other than the criminal
or the police-some third party--comes to possess evidence of crime.
Investigators often want to collect evidence from these third parties, as they
are more likely to cooperate and less likely to tip off the suspect that an
investigation is afoot.
The "third-party doctrine" is the Fourth Amendment rule that governs
collection of evidence from third parties in criminal investigations.' The rule
is simple: By disclosing to a third party, the subject gives up all of his
Fourth Amendment rights in the information revealed. According to the
Supreme Court:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used
only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will
not be betrayed.2
In other words, a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information disclosed to a third party.3 The Fourth Amendment simply does
not apply.
The third-party doctrine is the Fourth Amendment rule scholars love to
hate. It is the Lochner4 of search and seizure law, widely criticized as pro-
foundly misguided.5 Decisions applying the doctrine "top[] the chart of [the]
I. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528-29 (2006) (de-
scribing the third-party doctrine).
2. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
4. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. A list of every article or book that has criticized the doctrine would make this the world's
longest law review footnote. However, some of the major criticisms include Gerald G. Ashdown,
The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy", 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315
(1981); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. L.J.
549, 564-66 (1990); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Inno-
cent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983) (arguing that the third-party doctrine cases are incorrect
because they focus on the rights of the guilty rather than the rights of the innocent); Scott E. Sundby,
"Everyman" 's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1757-58 (1994).
Recent criticisms of the doctrine include CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE
NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 151-64 (2007); Susan W.
Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Trans-
actional Data. 14 J.L. & POL'Y 211 (2006) (arguing that the major third-party doctrine cases were
wrongly decided on several grounds); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy,
2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3; Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment:
Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975
(2007); Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the
Case for a "'Crazy Quilt" of Fourth Amendment Protection, 2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 3-4 (advo-
cating a "retooling" of the third-party doctrine for internet searches); Andrew J. DeFilippis, Note,
Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to Privity in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115
YALE L.J. 1086, 1092 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court should overrule the third-party doc-
trine).
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most-criticized fourth amendment cases. 6 Wayne LaFave asserts in his in-
fluential treatise that the Court's decisions applying it are "dead wrong"7 and
"make[] a mockery of the Fourth Amendment.' 8 The verdict among com-
mentators has been frequent and apparently unanimous: The third-party
doctrine is not only wrong,9 but horribly wrong.'o Even many state court
judges have agreed. Over a dozen state Supreme Courts have rejected the
doctrine under parallel provisions of their state constitutions.
Remarkably, even the U.S. Supreme Court has never offered a clear ar-
gument in its favor. Many Supreme Court opinions have applied the
doctrine; few have defended it. The closest the Court has come to justifying
the doctrine has been its occasional assertion that people who disclose
communications to a third party "assume the risk" that their information
will end up in the hands of the police. 2 But assumption of risk is a result
rather than a rationale: A person must assume a risk only when the Constitu-
tion does not protect it. Exactly why the Constitution does not protect
information disclosed to third parties has been left unexplained.
This Article offers a defense of the third-party doctrine, and especially
its most controversial applications. It argues that the doctrine serves two
roles that critics have missed. The first and most important purpose is to
maintain the technological neutrality of Fourth Amendment rules. Use of
third parties has a substitution effect: It takes open and public portions of
crimes and hides them from public observation. Without the third-party doc-
trine, savvy wrongdoers could use third-party services in a tactical way to
enshroud the entirety of their crimes in zones of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. The result would allow technology to upset the Fourth Amendment's
traditional balance between privacy and security, weakening the deterrent
and retributive goals of criminal punishment. The third-party doctrine
blocks this end-run around the traditional Fourth Amendment balance. It
6. Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of 'Search' in the Fourth
Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IowA L. REv. 541, 580 (1988).
7. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.7(c), at 747 (4th ed. 2004).
8. Id. § 2.7(b), at 736 ("Such a crabbed interpretation of the Katz test makes a mockery of
the Fourth Amendment.").
9. See sources cited supra note 5.
10. See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 2.7(c), at 747 ("The result reached in Miller is dead
wrong, and the Court's woefully inadequate reasoning does great violence to the theory of Fourth
Amendment protection which the Court had developed in Katz."); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amend-
ment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 747, 753 (2005) ("The third party doctrine presents one of the most serious threats to privacy
in the digital age.").
I1. For a list of states that have rejected the doctrine, in whole or in part, see Stephen E.
Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How To Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Ana-
logs To Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55" CATH. U. L. REv. 373
(2006).
12. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) ("Because the depositor [in Miller] 'as-
sumed the risk' of disclosure, the Court held that it would be unreasonable for him to expect his
financial records to remain private.").
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helps ensure that the Fourth Amendment rules that apply to crimes commit-
ted using third parties are roughly equivalent to the rules that apply to
crimes committed without them.
The doctrine's second role is to provide ex ante clarity. Under the third-
party doctrine, Fourth Amendment protection for information matches the
Fourth Amendment protection for the environment in which it is stored. As a
result, Fourth Amendment rules are determined by information's knowable
location rather than its unknowable history. Absent the third-party doctrine,
courts would face the difficult challenge of creating a clear regime of Fourth
Amendment protection for third-party information. Although such chal-
lenges are not insurmountable, the clarity of the third-party doctrine
provides an important argument in its favor.
The third-party doctrine is no panacea, of course. Critics have made two
important arguments against it, one doctrinal and the other functional. 3 The
doctrinal argument is that the Justices do not understand the privacy inter-
ests at stake in third-party information. To these critics, the Justices'
assertion that disclosure automatically renders an expectation of privacy
"unreasonable" is simply incorrect. 4 The second argument is functional: It
contends that the doctrine is misguided because it grants govemments the
authority to take more invasive steps without constitutional oversight than
are consistent with a free and open society. In particular, the third-party doc-
trine gives government officials too much power to harass individuals in bad
faith."
This Article explains that while both criticisms have some appeal, both
considerably overstate the case and ignore important counterarguments. As-
sertions that the Justices do not understand privacy are objections more
about form than substance. Although the third-party doctrine has been
framed in terms of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, it is better
understood as a consent doctrine. Disclosure to third parties eliminates pro-
tection because it implies consent. When understood as a subset of consent
law rather than an application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test,
the third-party doctrine fits naturally within the rest of Fourth Amendment
law.
Finally, functional arguments about government power overlook the legal
system's substitutes for Fourth Amendment protection. The Fourth Amend-
ment is not the only game in town. Common law privileges, entrapment law,
the Massiah doctrine, First Amendment doctrine, and statutory privacy protec-
tions have been designed specifically to address concerns of police
harassment in their use of third parties.' 6 These mostly nonconstitutional legal
principles each regulate specific aspects of third-party practices to deter po-
lice abuses, generally forcing the police to use third parties in good faith or
13. See infra Section I.B.
14. See infra Section I.B. 1.
15. See infra Section I.B.2.
16. All of these doctrines are discussed infra Section IV.B.
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in a reasonable way. Critics have overlooked these substitutes, and as a re-
sult have tended to see the choice as between Fourth Amendment protection
or no protection at all. Understanding how other doctrines substitute for
Fourth Amendment protection reveals that this understanding is incorrect.
The goal of this Article is to replace the partial view of the third-party
doctrine found in existing scholarship with a richer and more balanced ac-
count of its costs and benefits. The topic is a timely one: Technological
progress places more and more communications in the hands of third par-
ties, 7 and the growing importance of new technologies such as the internet
has led to a renewal of the attacks on the third-party doctrine." Given the
latest wave of criticisms, a more complete understanding is needed to better
appreciate how the Fourth Amendment should apply both in the case of old
technologies and new ones. I do not expect that the arguments offered in this
Article will persuade every critic to change positions; reasonable people can
disagree on whether the doctrine is appropriate in particular cases. At the
same time, I hope the Article will demonstrate a strong affirmative argument
for the doctrine in many cases and at least a plausible argument in others.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly introduces the law of
the third-party doctrine and the harsh criticisms of it. Part II argues that the
third-party doctrine ensures technological neutrality of the Fourth Amend-
ment by blocking the opportunistic use of third parties to circumvent the
basic balance of Fourth Amendment rules. Part III contends that the doctrine
is needed to provide ex ante clarity. The Fourth Amendment's suppression
remedy requires clear rules governing when a Fourth Amendment search
occurs, and the third-party doctrine creates that needed certainty. Part IV
responds to the two primary criticisms of the third-party doctrine, that the
doctrine is doctrinally unpersuasive and that it gives too much power to the
police. It argues that the first claim is largely a matter of form and that the
latter is addressed by legal rules beyond the Fourth Amendment.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
This Part explains the third-party doctrine and summarizes the two basic
types of cases: those involving secret agents such as undercover informants,
and those involving third-party account records. This Part also introduces
the two primary criticisms of the third-party doctrine. The first criticism is
doctrinal in nature; it asserts that it is simply incorrect to say that third-party
exposure renders an expectation of privacy "unreasonable."' 9 The second
criticism is functional; it claims that the third-party doctrine gives the gov-
20
ernment too much power over individuals.
17. See Solove, supra note 1, at 528-29.
18. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5.
19. See infra Section ll.B.I.
20. See infra Section Il.B.2.
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A. The Cases
1. Secret Agents, 1952-1971
Although several of the Supreme Court's earliest cases in the law of
criminal procedure involved the use of undercover agents and confidential
informants2-so-called "secret agents 22-a Fourth Amendment challenge
to such secret agents did not reach the Court until On Lee v. United States.
23
Lee sold opium from his laundry store and one day made incriminating
statements to his friend Poy. It turned out that Poy was an undercover in-
formant wearing a wire, and the recording of Lee's statements was used
against Lee at trial. Lee argued that the government's conduct violated the
Fourth Amendment because it was the equivalent of secretly placing a bug
inside the store.
The Supreme Court disagreed. According to Justice Jackson, Lee simply
"was talking confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted. 24 The fact
that Poy was wearing a wire was irrelevant, because the recording was "with
the connivance of one of the parties, 25 to the conversation (that is, Poy).
Justice Jackson suggested that the very idea of seeing these facts as prob-
lematic under the Fourth Amendment was quite silly: "It would be a dubious
service to the genuine liberties protected by the Fourth Amendment to make
them bedfellows with spurious liberties improvised by farfetched analogies
,,26
The Court reached the same result a decade later in Lopez v. United
States. 27 Lopez tried to bribe an IRS agent who was wearing a wire, and both
the recording and the agent's testimony were admitted against Lopez at trial.
Citing On Lee, Justice Harlan readily rejected Lopez's claim that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated: "Lopez knew full well [his statements]
could be used against him by [the IRS agent] if he wished,"" and the wire
recording "device was used only to obtain the most reliable evidence possi-
ble of a conversation in which the Government's own agent was a
participant and which that agent was fully entitled to disclose. 29
21. For example, in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), a business acquaintance of
a criminal suspect pretended to pay a social visit at the suspect's office when he in fact was intend-
ing to search the office for evidence. Eleven years later, in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(1932), an undercover prohibition agent looking for alcohol gained entrance to a suspect's home by
posing as a tourist. Although these cases involved secret agents, they did not specifically raise
Fourth Amendment challenges to secret agents' use.
22. See, e.g., YALE KAMiSAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 465 (12th ed. 2008).
23. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
24. Id. at 753.
25. Id. at 754.
26. Id.
27. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
28. Id. at 438.
29. Id. at 439.
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Lopez was followed quickly by Lewis v. United States"' and Hoffa v.
United States,3 handed down the same day in 1966. In Lewis, the defendant
invited an undercover agent into his home to sell him marijuana. In Hoffa,
Teamsters President Jimmy Hoffa confided in his colleague Partin, who
turned out to be working secretly for the police. In both cases, the secret
agents later testified about what they had seen and heard. Relying on Lopez
and On Lee, the Court concluded that neither use of secret agents had vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment. While Hoffa "was relying upon his misplaced
confidence that Partin would not reveal his wrongdoing," the Fourth
Amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person
to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."3 And
use of an undercover officer in Lewis could not be unconstitutional because
such a rule would severely hamper undercover investigations:
Were we to hold the deceptions of the agent in this case constitutionally
prohibited, we would come near to a rule that the use of undercover agents
in any manner is virtually unconstitutional per se. Such a rule would, for
example, severely hamper the Government in ferreting out those organized
criminal activities that are characterized by covert dealings with victims
who either cannot or do not protest."
The last of the secret agent cases, United States v. White,34 affirmed that
the third-party doctrine survived the formal switch to the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test first articulated in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz
v. United States.3" The facts of White were almost identical to those of
Lopez: White spoke about his crimes to an undercover informant who was
wearing a wire, and the recordings of the conversations were used against
him at trial.36 The plurality opinion by Justice White concluded that Hoffa,
Lopez, and On Lee had survived Katz.37 Katz did not disturb that line of
cases because it "involved no revelation to the Government by a party to
conversations with the defendant. 38 In the language of White, an expectation
that a person would not share private information with the police was not
constitutionally justifiable:
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that
his companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts
their trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never
30. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
31. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
32. Id. at 302.
33. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210.
34. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
35. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
36. White, 401 U.S. at 746-47.
37. Id. at 749-50.
38. Id. at 749. Because Justice Black's concurring opinion adopted a far broader rationale,
Justice White's plurality opinion expresses the holding of the Court.
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materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he
has, the risk is his.39
Exactly why this conclusion was "inescapable"-and why "the risk is his"-
was left unexplained.
2. Business Records, 1973-1980
The second round of third-party doctrine cases occurred from 1973 to
1980, and they all involved various types of business records. In all of the
cases, the Court held that transferring business records to third parties relin-
quished Fourth Amendment protection. In Couch v. United States,40 Couch
had given tax documents to his accountant, and the government issued an
IRS summons ordering the accountant to hand over documents that related
41 42to Couch's tax returns. In United States v. Miller, the government served
subpoenas on banks used by the defendant Miller seeking all records relat-
43ing to his accounts. In United States v. Payner, investigators stole a
briefcase owned by the vice president of a bank in the Bahamas and then
copied the briefcase's contents before returning it. The contents revealed
that Payner maintained an account at the bank, and this helped the govern-
ment show that Payner had falsified his tax returns.4
In all three cases, the defendant moved to suppress the financial records
under the Fourth Amendment. In all three cases, the Court rejected the
claims under the third-party doctrine in opinions by Justice Powell. In
Couch, Justice Powell concluded that "there can be little expectation of pri-
vacy where records are handed to an accountant., 45 By handing information
to his accountant, Couch had given his accountant the power to decide what
46information would be further disclosed in Couch's income tax returns. In
Miller, Justice Powell used two different arguments. First, the bank records
were not the defendant's private or personal letters, but rather were financial
documents that would be used in the ordinary course of business.47 Second,
the defendant had voluntarily conveyed the information to a third party just
like White, Hoffa, and Lopez. "[I]n revealing his affairs to another," the de-
fendant had assumed the risk "that the information [would] be conveyed by
39. Id. at 752.
40. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
41. Id. at 324-25.
42. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
43. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
44. Id. at 728-30.
45. Couch, 409 U.S. at 335.
46. See id. ("What information is not disclosed is largely in the accountant's discretion ....
Indeed, the accountant himself risks criminal prosecution if he willfully assists in the preparation of
a false return. His own need for self-protection would often require the right to disclose the informa-
tion given him." (citation omitted)).
47. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
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that person to the Government. ' ' 1 In Payner, Justice Powell found the case
indistinguishable from Miller.9
Finally, the Court applied the third-party doctrine in Smith v. Maryland,0
a case involving pen registers. A pen register was a device installed at the
phone company to record the numbers dialed from a specific telephone. In
Smith, investigators had asked the phone company to install a pen register
on the home phone of a man suspected of robbing and then harassing a
woman by making anonymous phone calls. The pen register confirmed that
the calls were originating from the man's home, and that information was
used to help get a warrant to search his home." The Supreme Court held that
use of the pen register was not a "search" because it was covered by the
third-party doctrine: "When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily con-
veyed numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing,
petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the
numbers he dialed.'5 2 According to Justice Blackmun, writing for the major-
ity, "[t]he switching equipment that processed those numbers [was] merely
the modem counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally
completed calls for the subscriber."53 The third-party doctrine applied even
though "the telephone company ha[d] decided to automate. 54
B. Common Criticisms of the Third-Party Doctrine
The criticisms of the third-party doctrine derive from two basic argu-
ments, one doctrinal and the other functional. Both arguments were first
developed in dissents from the important third-party doctrine cases, most
notably Justice Harlan's dissent in White55 and Justice Marshall's dissent in
Smith 6 In the decades since these opinions, a large body of scholarship has
echoed and expanded on their two basic claims.
1. The Doctrinal Critique
The first important criticism of the third-party doctrine is that it does not
accurately apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test. According to
48. Id. at 443.
49. Payner, 447 U.S. at 732 ("United States v. Miller established that a depositor has no
expectation of privacy and thus no protectable Fourth Amendment interest in copies of checks and
deposit slips retained by his bank. Nothing in the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case."
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
50. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
51. Id. at 737.
52. Id. at 744.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 745.
55. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768-95 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. Smith, 442 U.S. at 748-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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critics, individuals normally expect privacy in their bank records, phone re-
cords, and other third-party records.57 Such expectations of privacy are
common and reasonable, and Justices who cannot see that are simply out of
touch with society and are misapplying the Fourth Amendment. From this
perspective, it "defies reality"59 to say that a person "voluntarily" surrenders
information to third parties like banks or telephone companies.60 As Justice
Marshall reasoned in his Smith dissent, "[i]t is idle to speak of 'assuming'
risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic
alternative.'
A corollary to this claim is that the Justices supporting the third-party
doctrine have misunderstood the concept of privacy. The Justices envision
privacy as an on-off switch, equating disclosure to one with disclosure to all,
62
and as a result they miss the many shades of gray. As Justice Marshall put
the point in Smith, "[plrivacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed abso-
lutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone
company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this informa-
tion will be released to other persons for other purposes.,,6' Echoing Justice
Marshall, Daniel Solove argues that the third-party doctrine is based on an
incorrect "conception of privacy," a conception of privacy as total secrecy.64
Along the same lines, Richard Posner argues that the Miller line of cases is
"unrealistic." 65 "Informational privacy does not mean refusing to share in-
formation with everyone," he maintains, for "[o]ne must not confuse
solitude with secrecy., 66 Sherry Colb agrees, writing that "treating exposure
to a limited audience as identical to exposure to the world' 67 fails to recog-
nize the degrees of privacy.
57. See, e.g., Ashdown, supra note 5, at 1315 ("[T]elephone patrons undoubtedly would be
shocked to learn that records of their calls either were available for third parties or were being dis-
tributed outside the telephone system."); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher,
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look
at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society", 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993) (arguing
that some Supreme Court cases "do not reflect societal understandings" of when an expectation of
privacy is "reasonable," and that "some of the Court's conclusions [about what expectations of pri-
vacy are reasonable] may be well off the mark").
58. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 57, at 732.
59. Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 829 (2005).
60. See also Ashdown, supra note 5, at 1315.
61. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 5, at 564-66.
63. Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2002).
65. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY 140 (2006).
66. Id.
67. Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doc-
trine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002).
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2. The Functional Critique
The second major critique of the third-party doctrine contends that it
gives the government more power than is consistent with a free and open
society. The first significant elaboration of this argument appears to be
Justice Harlan's dissent in United States v. White.6' Harlan argued that the
government should not be permitted to use an undercover informant with a
wire because leaving such a procedure unregulated would grant the govern-
ment too much power:
Were third-party bugging a prevalent practice, it might well smother that
spontaneity-reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant
discourse-that liberates daily life. Much off-hand exchange is easily for-
gotten and one may count on the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the
very fact of a limited audience, and the likelihood that the listener will ei-
ther overlook or forget what is said, as well as the listener's inability to
reformulate a conversation without having to contend with a documented
record. All these values are sacrificed by a rule of law that permits official
monitoring of private discourse limited only by the need to locate a willing
assistant. 69
Justice Marshall's dissent in Smith7° made a similar point. According to
Marshall, exempting pen registers from Fourth Amendment scrutiny enabled
unregulated monitoring that would be harmful to a free society:
The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring will undoubtedly
prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to hide. Many individu-
als, including members of unpopular political organizations or journalists
with confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of
their personal contacts. Permitting governmental access to telephone re-
cords on less than probable cause may thus impede certain forms of
political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a
truly free society."
Arnold Loewy picked up this theme in his 1983 article, The Fourth
Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent. 2 Loewy posited that
Fourth Amendment protections should protect the innocent, and then rea-
soned that the third-party doctrine cases gave the police too much power to
harass innocent citizens." By allowing undercover agents to record suspects
without judicial scrutiny, the Court had given them "the ability to use [the
recordings] for parlor games, practical jokes, or harassment.'7 4 By allowing
the police to install pen registers without oversight, the Court had left the
68. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
69. See id. at 787-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
70. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 748-52 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 751 (citations omitted).
72. Loewy, supra note 5.
73. Id. at 1252-56.
74. Id. at 1253.
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police "perfectly free to learn every telephone number that any persons [sic]
dials, subject only to the cooperation of the telephone company."75
76Other scholars have made similar points, often in discussions of how
the Fourth Amendment applies to computers and the Internet. Internet ser-
vices are third-party services, raising the prospect that the Fourth
Amendment may apply only modestly to internet communications. Scholars
have responded by contending that the third-party doctrine is "not respon-
sive to life in the modern Information Age.",7 If third-party services play a
growing role in government surveillance, the concern runs, then the Fourth
Amendment will regulate a smaller and smaller portion of that surveillance;
the government will be able to collect and assemble "digital dossiers" with-
18out Fourth Amendment scrutiny. To ensure sufficient constitutional
protection online, many argue, the third-party cases should be overruled or
sharply limited to their facts.7 9
II. SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS AND THE FUNCTIONAL ROLE
OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
The widespread criticism of the third-party doctrine overlooks two im-
portant benefits of the rule. This Part explains the first major benefit of the
third-party doctrine: It ensures technological neutrality in Fourth Amend-
ment rules. The use of third parties has a substitution effect. It enables
wrongdoers to take public aspects of their crimes and replace them with
private transactions. Without a third-party doctrine, suspects can act oppor-
tunistically to effectively hide their criminal enterprises from observation.
The result upsets the basic balance of Fourth Amendment law, undercutting
the deterrent and retributive force of criminal law. The third-party doctrine
blocks such efforts, resulting in a rough equivalence in the overall amount of
privacy for criminals acting alone and the amount of privacy for those using
third parties.
To develop this argument, I will start with the basic balance of the
Fourth Amendment. I will explain how third parties threaten this balance
and how the third-party doctrine retains it. I will then cover a few examples
75. Id. at 1255.
76. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 5, at 568-69 ("The government is free from any judicial over-
sight. Without a reasonableness limitation, we must rely on government officials to voluntarily
respect our privacy.").
77. Solove, supra note 64, at 1087.
78. Id.; Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under Justice Stevens's Fourth
Amendment?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1736-45 (2006).
79. E.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1375, 1403 (2004) (articulating that the third-party doctrine should be construed narrowly in
the context of computer and internet communications); Freiwald, supra note 5, at 40; Deirdre K.
Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557 (2004) (arguing that the
third-party doctrine should be read narrowly in the case of computer and internet communications).
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and conclude by showing how the doctrine is an essential aspect of the tech-
nological neutrality of Fourth Amendment rules.
A. The Basic Division of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and sei-
zures is premised on a balance between privacy and security. To implement
that balance, the Supreme Court has created two basic categories of law en-
forcement conduct: investigative steps that the Fourth Amendment regulates
and those that it does not. Under this scheme, the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects some things and some places while leaving others open to government
surveillance. For example, the Fourth Amendment protects a person's home
and private packages. 80 If the government wants access to those places, it
must ordinarily have a search warrant." On the other hand, occurrences in
public or on open fields are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 2 If the
government wants to monitor such spaces, the Fourth Amendment does not
interfere: The monitoring is not a search or seizure.
The Fourth Amendment's divide between unregulated and regulated
spaces forms an essential part of how the amendment works. It divides evi-
dence collection into two stages: less invasive steps the government can take
at any time, and more invasive steps the government can only take when it
has already collected enough evidence to demonstrate special conditions
such as probable cause or exigent circumstances. From an investigative
standpoint, the two categories work together. Investigations often start with
the open surveillance, permitting the police to look for clues that may indi-
cate criminal activity. If the open surveillance yields sufficient evidence, that
evidence permits the government to take more invasive steps that are often
necessary to prove cases beyond a reasonable doubt in court.
8 3
The basic division into unregulated and regulated steps leads to a bal-
ance between privacy and security because most crimes have traditionally
required suspects to carry out at least part of their crimes in spaces open to
surveillance. To see why, consider a world with no advanced technology.
Part of the crime will normally occur outside. If John wants to rob a person
walking down the street, for example, he needs to leave his house and go out
to the street. If he wants to purchase drugs, he needs to go out of his home
and find a dealer who will sell them to him. If he wants to murder his co-
worker, he needs to go out and buy a knife; after the act, he needs to dispose
80. E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (noting that the "'chief evil against
which the Fourth Amendment is directed'" is the warrant-less entry and search of a home (quoting
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))).
81. Id.
82. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) ("The Fourth Amendment protection of
the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares.").
83. In the argot of existing doctrine, government conduct that violates a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy is a "search" that ordinarily triggers the warrant requirement; other government
conduct is not a "search" at all.
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of the body. In all of these traditional types of crimes, the wrongdoer has to
leave his home and go out into spaces unprotected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.
The public component of most traditional crimes is critical to the tradi-
tional balance of Fourth Amendment rules. If at least part of a crime occurs
in spaces unprotected by the Fourth Amendment, the police have at least
some opportunity to look more closely at whether criminal activity is afoot.
Because the police normally begin an investigation with only speculation
that a particular person is a lawbreaker, the public portion of crimes give the
police an opportunity to develop more evidence. The police will have access
to the public portion of the crime free of legal regulation. If they are observ-
ing him, they will know where the suspect went and what he said in public.
That information won't solve the crime in most cases: Unless an officer di-
rectly observes the crime, the publicly available evidence only provides a
lead.84 But it's a start. If the evidence is strong enough, it can support inva-
sions of protected spaces with a warrant. And those steps help the police
solve at least a moderate percentage of criminal cases. Of course, many
cases won't be solved. But enough cases are solved that a significant pros-
pect of criminal punishment exists, allowing the criminal justice system to
serve its utilitarian and retributive ends.
B. Third Parties and the Basic Division
Third parties pose a major threat to the Fourth Amendment's basic divi-
sion between unregulated and regulated steps. The reason is that third
parties act as remote agents that permit wrongdoers to commit crimes en-
tirely in private. Those committing crimes naturally try to hide them from
the police; no criminal wants to get caught. If a wrongdoer can use third
parties as remote agents, he can reduce his exposure to public surveillance.
Instead of going out into the world and subjecting himself to exposure, a
wrongdoer can bring third-party agents inside and share plans or delegate
tasks to them. He can use the third-party services to commit his crimes with-
out exposing himself to spaces open to government surveillance.
Put another way, the use of third parties often has a substitution effect.85
Without the third party, the wrongdoer would have needed to go out into
public spaces where the Fourth Amendment does not regulate surveillance.
But use of a third party substitutes a hidden transaction for the previously
open event. What would have been public now becomes hidden. The
wrongdoer no longer needs to leave his home, as the third-party agents
84. Of course, this is not true in every case: It is possible to imagine an entirely private crime
such as attempting suicide. But in most cases, some exposure is necessary.
85. In economics, a "substitution effect" generally refers to change in the amount of a prod-
uct consumed if the relative price of a competing product is raised. The concept of a substitution
effect can be applied more broadly, however, to show how two different means of committing a
crime can compete with each other. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 2385, 2387 (1997) (applying the substitution effect framework to criminal conduct).
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enable him to commit the crime remotely. The crime now comes to the• 86
criminal rather than the criminal going to the crime.
Consider how a person might use third parties to commit crimes from
the protection of his own home. A mob boss might summon his underlings
to his house to give them orders. A stalker might call his victim on his home
phone rather than lying in wait outside her door. A computer hacker might
hack into computers thousands of miles away without leaving his bedroom.
In all of these cases, individuals use third parties to carry on their crimes
without exposing themselves to spaces unprotected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. The third-party agents-the employee, the telephone, and the
Internet--do the work remotely on the principal's behalf.
Now we can see the importance of the third-party doctrine. Without the
doctrine, criminals could use third-party agents to fully enshroud their
criminal enterprises in Fourth Amendment protection. A criminal could plot
and execute his entire crime from home knowing that the police could not
send in undercover agents, record the fact of his phone calls, or watch any
aspect of his Internet usage without first obtaining a warrant. He could use
third parties to create a bubble of Fourth Amendment protection around the
entirety of his criminal activity.
The result would be a notable shift in the balance between privacy and
security. If any observation of any part of the target's conduct violates his
reasonable expectation of privacy, then the police would need a warrant to
observe any aspect of his behavior. That is, they would need probable cause
to believe that the evidence to be collected constitute evidence of the crime.
But if the entire crime were protected by a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, they couldn't observe any aspect of the crime to develop that probable
cause. The effect would be a Catch-22: The police would need probable
cause to observe evidence of the crime, but they would need to observe evi-
dence of the crime first to get to probable cause. In many cases, this would
eliminate the use of third-party evidence in investigations altogether. By the
time the police would have probable cause to believe that someone's third-
party records are evidence of crime, they usually would already have prob-
able cause to arrest and charge him with the crime. 7
86. Further, the ability to harness outsourcing tools also often comes with a capacity to
minimize the risk of betrayal. Criminals can control those in whom they confide, selecting only the
most trustworthy to tell criminal secrets. The mob boss might require all his minions to prove their
loyalty to him through deeds or a loyalty oath. The hacker will pick an Internet Service Provider that
promises it will never under any circumstances cooperate with the police. For a rational criminal, all
these steps make good sense. By only proceeding when the risk of betrayal is low, the criminal
ensures the greatest chance of success for his criminal enterprise.
87. For investigators to obtain a probable cause warrant, they must establish ex ante a "fair
probability" that evidence of the crime is located in the specific place the police wish to access. And
"fair probability" ex ante turns into a high probability ex post: Studies have found that warrants
prove successful-revealing the evidence sought-in the clear majority of cases. See RICHARD VAN
DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCEss 39 tbl.22 (1985) (reporting that warrants exe-
cuted by the police yielded most or all of the items listed on the warrant in between sixty-four and
eighty-two percent in the seven jurisdictions studied). Police will have such leads at the outset of
investigations only rarely. In most cases they will begin with a victim's report or a crime scene or an
anonymous tip; establishing probable cause about a particular wrongdoer and particular evidence
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The third-party doctrine responds with a rule that ensures roughly the
same degree of privacy protection regardless of whether a criminal commits
crimes on his own or uses third parties. The part of the crime that previously
was open to observation-the transaction itself-remains open to observa-
tion. The part of the crime that previously was hidden-what the suspect did
without third parties in his home-remains hidden. The result leaves the
Fourth Amendment rule neutral as to the means of committing the crime:
Using a third party does not change the overall level of Fourth Amendment
protection over the crime. If a person commits a crime on his own, the open
part of the crime may be observed by the police without a warrant. If he
harnesses a third party, the third party's involvement is treated as open, re-
sulting in roughly the same amount of open conduct as the self-executed
crime.
C. Examples
Examples help demonstrate how third parties create a substitution effect
and how the third-party doctrine maintains the same degree of privacy pro-
tection regardless of whether third parties are used. In particular, consider
the two most controversial applications of the third-party doctrine: the pen
88
register installed in Smith v. Maryland, and the bank account records re-
trieved in United States v. Miller.89
1. Smith v. Maryland-Pen Registers
Recall that in Smith v. Maryland,90 Smith harassed a robbery victim by
calling her repeatedly on the telephone. The police suspected Smith, and
they asked the phone company to install a pen register device that would
note any outgoing calls from his home phone. The pen register recorded the
fact of the call to the victim, suggesting that Smith was the harasser and
helping to provide the police with probable cause for a warrant to search his
home.
To understand the substitution effect here, we need to see exactly how
Smith used the third party of the telephone system to eliminate the public as-
pect of his crime. In a world without a telephone system, Smith would have
been forced to stalk his victim the old-fashioned way. Smith would have left
his house, walked to his car, and driven to his victim's home to harass her in
person. Instead of having the phone company install a pen register, the police
requires a great deal of additional leads. Under the third-party doctrine, the police have many tools
that they can use without probable cause to reach the probable cause threshold. They can ask
around; they can go undercover; they can get bank records. Those tools may help prove the probable
cause needed to obtain a warrant to search a home or to make an arrest. But if those tools themselves
require probable cause, then in a practical sense those tools are no longer available to officers to
help solve investigations.
88. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
89. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
90. Smith. 442 U.S. at 737-38.
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would have assigned an officer to watch Smith from public streets and "tail"
him around town. The officer would have watched Smith leave his home,
enter his car, and drive to the victim's house.
When we introduce the third party of the telephone system, however,
Smith no longer needs to leave home. To borrow from the old advertising
campaign for the Yellow Pages, he can "let [his] fingers do the walking."'"
What formerly would have occurred in the open air now takes place inside
the home using the third party of the telephone. Instead of watching Smith
in public, the police now need to install a pen register to get the equivalent
of the previously public information about what he was doing.
From this perspective, the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v.
Maryland properly blocks Smith's attempted end-run around the balance of
Fourth Amendment rules. Its conclusion that installation of the pen register
is not a search matches the Fourth Amendment protection for third-party
crimes to the preexisting protection for solo crimes. Smith's use of a third
party withdrew his identity from public surveillance: Instead of having to
travel to his victim, the telephone brought his victim to him (virtually, at
least). The pen register information substituted for the same information that
the police would have obtained by watching Smith on the public street.
Smith's physical presence was not protected in the physical world version of
the crime; under the third-party doctrine, his virtual presence is not pro-
tected in the third-party environment of the telephone network.92
2. United States v. Miller-Bank Records
Next consider United States v. Miller,93 and its finding of no Fourth
Amendment protection for bank records. The substitution effect is some-
what harder to see in this case, but I think it still explains the outcome. In
Miller, the government wanted to prove that Miller had set up an illegal al-
cohol still. Prosecutors used Miller's bank records to show that he had
purchased equipment for the still using his checking account.94 In other
words, the government used the checking account to prove a trade: Miller's
91. Paul R. La Monica, Let your fingers do the walking, CNNMONEY.COM, December 13,
2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/12/13/news/fortune500/yellow.
92. During the editing stage, I learned that Ric Simmons recently made a similar argument
about Smith. See Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology's
Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 553-
54 (2007). Simmons and I share a similar approach to how technology impacts Fourth Amendment
protection; both of us have emphasized how technological change can both take away government
power and expand it, and how Fourth Amendment rules respond to changes in both directions. See
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 864-67 (2004); Simmons, supra, at 535-36. Simmons ultimately
condemns the third-party doctrine, calling it "dangerously short-sighted," but that is because he
assumes that the doctrine must also apply to the contents of communications. Simmons, supra, at
555. As I explain in Section 1.D, I do not think the third-party doctrine needs to apply to contents of
communications. With that caveat, I agree with the basic approach of Professor Simmons.
93. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
94. Specifically, Miller had written a check to rent a van and purchase radio equipment,
sheet metal, and metal pipe. See id. at 438.
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cash, drawn from the bank, in exchange for the items he was purchasing to
build the still. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not
protect Miller's bank records; specifically, it did not protect from govern-
ment scrutiny the checks Miller had to written make those trades.95
In Miller, the checking account created a substitution effect by replacing
a transaction that would have included substantial public components with a
transaction that would normally occur entirely in private. To see how, imag-
ine a world without banks. If you need to pay for something in this world,
you would need to get the money to do it: You would need to travel to your
stash, pick up the money, and then travel to the place where you are making
your purchase. If you are the seller, you need to receive the money, take it
back to your stash, and store it away for safekeeping. There are public parts
of the transaction on both sides. Checks and other credit instruments elimi-
nate the need to travel. The buyer no longer needs to travel to bring the
money to the seller, and the seller no longer needs to travel to put the money
away. Instead, the seller deposits the check and the funds from the bank are
sent directly to him. The buyer and seller don't have to move anymore, as
the check moves the funds out of and into their accounts without them need-
ing to go anywhere. The third party of the checking account makes the
entire economic transaction private.
Use of the third-party doctrine in the Miller case is plausible because
checking services replace significantly public transactions with private ones.
The third-party doctrine ensures that the same Fourth Amendment rules ap-
ply to checking account transactions that would have applied to the public
transactions that they replace.
D. Third Parties and Technology Neutrality
I recognize that the model above is a bit artificial. It imagines a mythical
year zero in which no third parties existed, whether of the human or me-
chanical type. Obviously, no such time existed. The model above also
imagines that the substitution effect will occur equally in every case. It
won't: Criminals can use third parties to withdraw the public portion of their
crimes, but they certainly don't have to do so. In the Smith case, for exam-
ple, Smith could have placed his anonymous stalking call from a public pay
phone with the door open; or, in the modem equivalent, he could have used
a cell phone in a crowded city street and spoken loudly so all could hear. If
he had done this, using a third party would not have altered the open aspect
of the crime.
95. The Miller court explained:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to the Government. This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and con-
veyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will
not be betrayed.
Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
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At the same time, the somewhat simplified model reveals an essential
dynamic about the use of third parties: In general, the use of a third party
can create a substitution effect where the wrongdoer wishes it to do so.
Hoffa could choose to speak only to close colleagues in the safety of his
hotel room; Smith could choose to call his victim only from his own home
phone. Use of a third party does not always have a substitution effect, but it
enables the effect at the suspect's option. And any smart criminal will exer-
cise the option. Those who have the most to hide have the most incentive to
take advantage of how third-party services can hide their activity. Even
without Fourth Amendment rules, third-party services will tend to hide oth-
erwise public transactions. A rational actor bent on criminal conduct will use
as many third-party services as he can to avoid detection.
Viewed from this perspective, the third-party doctrine is not some sort of
mysterious hole in Fourth Amendment protection. To the contrary, it is a
natural analog to the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States.96
Katz effectively required technological neutrality: Although its precise rea-
soning is opaque, it is often understood as concluding that telephone calls
are protected because of the function they serve rather than the accident of
the technology they use.97 Indeed, this was the basic rationale of Justice
Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States.98 Brandeis feared that tech-
nological change could narrow Fourth Amendment protection: "Ways may
some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers
from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home."9
Brandeis proposed that the Fourth Amendment should keep up as technol-
ogy changed so that new technologies would not gut privacy.
But if we embrace this understanding of the Fourth Amendment, then
surely it must be a two-way street. Just as the new technologies can bring
"intimate occurrences of the home" out in the open, so can technological
change and the use of third parties take transactions that were out in the
open and bring them inside. If we accept that the Fourth Amendment should
stay technology neutral, then we should accept that rule both when new
technological practices threaten to expand Fourth Amendment protection as
when they threaten to constrict it. Just as the Fourth Amendment should pro-
tect that which technology exposes, so should the Fourth Amendment permit
access to that which technology hides. From this perspective, the third-party
doctrine is needed to ensure the technology neutrality of the Fourth
96. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
97. The Katz Court stated:
One who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits
him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will
not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.
Id. at 352.
98. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 474.
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Amendment. It ensures that we have the same rough degree of Fourth
Amendment protection independently of whether wrongdoers use third-
party agents to facilitate their crimes.
More broadly, the third-party doctrine in no way undermines Katz,
which famously held that the contents of a call from a public telephone re-
ceive Fourth Amendment protection. The contents of communications sent
over third-party networks do not trigger substitution effects: The use of the
network does not hide contents that previously were open. When a person
visits another in his home, the fact of the visit occurs in public but the actual
contents of their conversations remain shielded from observation. Extending
the Fourth Amendment to contents of communications but excluding ad-
dress information-as the Supreme Court did in Katz and Smith-maintains
that status quo and follows a technologically neutral approach to constitu-
tional protection.
Il. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AND Ex ANTE CLARITY
The second important role of the third-party doctrine is to foster ex ante
clarity in Fourth Amendment rules. The on/off switch of the suppression
remedy demands clear Fourth Amendment rules on what police conduct
triggers Fourth Amendment protection and what police conduct does not.' 0
The third-party doctrine creates ex ante clarity by matching the Fourth
Amendment rules for information with the Fourth Amendment rules for lo-
cation. Under the doctrine, rights in information extinguish when the
information arrives at its destination. This means that the present location of
information defines the Fourth Amendment rules for collecting it, and the
Fourth Amendment rules are constant within each location.
Without the third-party doctrine, courts would have to develop some al-
ternative test, with the same ex ante clarity, for identifying when
information is protected under the Fourth Amendment. This task may not be
impossible, but it is quite difficult. Few critics of the third-party doctrine
have tried. And the difficulty of devising a clear alternative to the third-party
doctrine provides a second argument in its favor.
A. Ex Ante Clarity Under the Third-Party Doctrine
To understand the importance of ex ante clarity, it is essential to recog-
nize that the exclusionary rule provides the primary mechanism for
enforcing the Fourth Amendment.'°' If the police violate a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy and no exception applies, the evidence obtained ordinarily
100. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REv. 503,
527 (2007) ("The Fourth Amendment's suppression remedy ... generates tremendous pressure on
the courts to implement the Fourth Amendment using clear ex ante rules rather than vague ex post
standards.").
101. See id. at 527-28.
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will be suppressed and the wrongdoer may go free.' °z The severe costs of the
exclusionary rule require ex ante clarity in the rules for when a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists. The police need to know when their conduct
triggers Fourth Amendment protection. Uncertainty can both overdeter po-
lice from acting when no protection exists and can lead them to
inadvertently trample on Fourth Amendment rights.0 3
The third-party doctrine ensures ex ante clarity by matching the Fourth
Amendment rules for collecting information with the location of the infor-
mation collected. When information arrives at its destination, the Fourth
Amendment rules for collecting the information match with the rules for
collecting other evidence there. This is true because rights in information
extinguish when the information arrives at its destination; the information
has been disclosed to its recipient, and any preexisting Fourth Amendment
protection no longer existst °' This approach is essential to the clarity of
Fourth Amendment rules because it guarantees that once information is pre-
sent in a location it is treated just like everything else located there. Because
the history of information is erased when it arrives, the law can impose rules
as to what the police can or cannot do based on the known location of the
search instead of the unknown history of the information obtained.
Consider a letter that arrives in the mail, is opened, and sits on the re-
cipient's desk at home in a stack of other letters and other papers. The third-
party doctrine dictates that the letter is treated just like all the other papers
on the desk. The sender has Fourth Amendment rights in the letter during
transmission, but once it arrives at its destination, those rights disappear. '0 If
the police wish to search the home and come across a stack of papers in-
cluding the letter, the Fourth Amendment rules they must follow will be set
by the usual rules of home searches rather than special rules for each piece
of paper defined by the history of each page. By erasing the history of in-
formation for Fourth Amendment purposes, the third-party doctrine ensures
that all information in the same location is treated in the same way. This is
critical because the police will normally know the status of the place they
search but not the history of the items found inside it.
The significance of the ex ante clarity provided by the third-party doc-
trine is demonstrated by the surprising difficulty of developing alternatives
to the doctrine that can retain that clarity. Under the third-party doctrine, if
A tells a secret to B, A has no rights in B's possession of the information. If
the third-party doctrine is rejected, however, A's rights in that information
should continue even though B has the information now in addition to A. In
other words, information should retain a history: The Fourth Amendment
rules that apply to information should consider where the information has
been in the past and in what circumstances it was held and disclosed. The
102. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment's
suppression remedy to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
103. See Kerr, supra note 100, at 527-28.
104. See supra Section II.A.
105. See United States v. Villarreal, 963 F2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1992).
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question is, how far should those rights go? Should they extend forever?
What should extinguish them? For the most part, the scholarly commentary
has ignored this problem: Most scholars who criticize the doctrine do so
without actually explaining what test should replace it.'06 But if it takes a
theory to beat a theory, then surely it takes a doctrine to beat a doctrine. And
it turns out to be quite difficult to devise a replacement for the third-party
doctrine that would provide the needed clarity.
B. Ex Ante Clarity Under a Probabilistic Alternative
Because there are several different ways to determine when an expecta-
tion of privacy is reasonable,10 7 it helps to consider two different alternatives
to replace the third-party doctrine. One alternative is what I have termed the
probabilistic model of Fourth Amendment protection.0 8 Under this ap-
proach, whether government conduct violates a reasonable expectation of
privacy depends on a fact-specific inquiry as to whether a reasonable person
would have expected that the information would remain private.1°9 This is a
prospective inquiry from the standpoint of the suspect: The question is
whether a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would expect the in-
formation to be widely disseminated. In this Section, I will explain why the
probabilistic approach cannot create the needed clarity. A probabilistic ap-
proach would rest the inquiry on a largely unknowable question; the police
would have difficulty applying the Fourth Amendment because they nor-
mally would be unable to reconstruct whether someone reasonably expected
privacy in the information collected.
The core difficulty with applying a probabilistic approach to third-party
information is that information's history is often complex and impossible to
reconstruct. Just as a glass of water from a kitchen sink tap might have been
rainwater in the Amazon thousands of years ago, information today often
has a long past of interpersonal transmission. What a person knows and
thinks reflects what he has seen, smelled, heard, touched, and felt. Our ex-
periences reflect what the world has exposed to us. Many of those
experiences hinge on what others thought and experienced long before us:
Our thoughts are a combination of the views of generations past; our words
are a pastiche of ourselves and others and the life experiences of many peo-
ple at once. As a result, we can't model information transmission as a simple
path from A to B. Rather, most transmissions will be a complex meandering
journey from A to B to C to D to E with U-turns and curves along the way.
This complexity inhibits ex ante clarity for the police because they will
necessarily collect information at the end of its dissemination, whereas judg-
ments as to whether and when privacy is likely must be made prospectively.
106. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 64, at 1083 (criticizing the third-party doctrine, but not
proposing a clear alternative to it).
107. See generally Kerr, supra note 100, at 503.
108. See id. at 508-12.
109. Id.
February 20091
Michigan Law Review
From the perspective of the individual sending out information, who is curi-
ous about whether he will maintain his rights, he will assess whether the
information recipient appears trustworthy. He might ask whether the recipi-
ent has a privacy policy, and might ask whether he has failed to maintain
privacy in the past to predict what may happen in the future. But criminal
investigators do not have this luxury. They must roll the tape backwards,
starting with the present and trying to reconstruct the past. The determina-
tion of whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable in a probabilistic
sense is highly contextual, and the context will be dramatically different at
various transfer points in the history of information. As a result, the Fourth
Amendment rules that the police must apply ex ante must hinge on details
of the history of information that they cannot know ex ante and may be un-
able to reconstruct at all.
A simple example demonstrates the problem. Imagine that a federal
prosecutor is a regular reader of CorruptionWatch.com, a blog about public
corruption crimes. One day he visits the blog and finds an anonymous
comment left by an unidentified reader: "I heard that Senator Smith was
seen in public today depositing a $50,000 check from Jack Abramoff into
Senator Smith's personal account at Ames Bank. Did Abramoff bribe him?
Does anyone know? Email me at SenatorSmithsSecrets@gmail.com."
The prosecutor is curious about what the commenter knows, and he
wants to subpoena the author of the comment. But what Fourth Amendment
rule would govern such a subpoena? Under the third-party doctrine, the rule
is the traditional one for issuing subpoenas. The history of the information is
irrelevant to the legal rule that must be followed. But imagine a world in
which the current third-party doctrine is replaced with a probabilistic model.
Suddenly the Fourth Amendment rule is unclear. We do not know whether
the subpoena will implicate Senator Smith's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy because we don't know who the commenter is or how he came to know
what he knows.
Consider five possibilities. In the first, the comment author is the bank
teller who served Senator Smith and helped him deposit the check. In the
second, the author is a fellow Ames Bank customer in line behind Senator
Smith who overheard Senator Smith loudly announcing that he was there to
deposit a $50,000 check from Jack Abramoff. In the third, the author is a
bank robber who broke into the bank and looked through Senator Smith's
files. In the fourth, the author is Jack Abramoff, who wants to get Senator
Smith in trouble so he can negotiate a better deal with the feds. In the fifth,
the author is Senator Smith himself, who was just curious to see if anyone
would believe the story if he posted it online anonymously. In which of
these cases would the subpoena violate Senator Smith's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy under a probabilistic approach-that is, where a reasonable
expectation of privacy is based on a probabilistic assessment of whether
Senator Smith would reasonably expect his conduct to be widely dissemi-
nated? Perhaps the answer is that the first and third violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the second and fifth do not, and the fourth depends
on the details of the relationship between Smith and Abramoff. But how can
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the police know this? They need to know what they will learn before they
can know ex post if their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.
And this is just the tip of the iceberg. Matters get much more compli-
cated if the Fourth Amendment recognizes information history past the
immediate question of the most recent "hop" back from its final resting
point. For example, Joe might tell a secret to Jane, who might share it with
Ben, who might write it in his diary that is stolen by Sarah, who might post
it on a blog that is read by Earl, who might tell it in confidence to a govern-
ment informant. Now ask the question: did the informant's learning the
information violate anyone's reasonable expectation of privacy? We need to
look past Earl, as we also need to answer the question for Sarah, Ben, Jane,
and Joe. And for that matter, we need to know how Joe knew the secret in
the first place; we need to trace the information to the very moment it ap-
peared that someone's reasonable expectation of privacy might be violated.
And of course all of that information must be known before the information
is even acquired; somehow the police must know the detailed information
history of information they have not yet seen. Under the third-party doc-
trine, these extremely difficult questions no longer need be asked.
Information history becomes irrelevant.
C. Ex Ante Clarity with a Policy-Based Alternative
A second alternative to the existing third-party doctrine would be what I
have termed a policy-based approach. " ° Under this approach, a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists when, as a matter of policy, it is better for a
particular practice to be regulated by a warrant requirement than for it to be
unregulated by the Fourth Amendment."' When courts apply a policy
model, they categorize the case before them and decide whether a reason-
able expectation of privacy should extend as a matter of policy to that
category of facts. A policy approach clearly can lead to greater clarity than
the probabilistic method, as it provides a way for courts to generate rules
that apply to categories of cases. However, generating clear Fourth Amend-
ment rules based purely on policy considerations turns out to be relatively
difficult.
In my view, there are two major difficulties with using policy-based
rules to generate clear rules over third-party information. The first problem
is that there are hundreds of potentially distinct applications of the third-
party doctrine, and courts would need to apply the policy model to each of
them to determine whether the information should be protected. The third-
party doctrine is one size fits all; there is no need for case-by-case policy
balancing. But if courts try to engage in policy balancing for each type of
record, they will be forced to resolve how the balancing applies to a very
wide range of cases. For example, many critics may want to overrule Miller,
the case involving bank records, or Smith, the case involving pen registers.
110. See id. at 519-22.
111. Id.
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But what about Fourth Amendment rules for credit card records? Electricity
records? Gas meter records? Telephone records? Internet records? IP ad-
dresses? Book store records? Clothing store records? Record store records?
iTunes accounts? Undercover agents wearing wires? Undercover agents not
wearing wires? Until each of these questions was settled by the courts,
agents would have no way of knowing how the law governed access to such
information.
Second, because many applications of the third-party doctrine involve
developing technologies, the outcome of a policy-based determination of
how the Fourth Amendment should apply to third-party information can
change over time.' 12 Consider how the Fourth Amendment could apply to so-
called trap-and-trace information: information obtained through the gov-
ernment's collection of incoming telephone numbers for a particular
telephone account."' Until the spread of "caller ID" services, most individu-
als presumably thought of caller ID information as private; today, on the
other hand, the disclosure of the incoming telephone number is simply a
standard part of placing a telephone call. The changing social meaning of
trap-and-trace information can create uncertainty for police investigators. If
courts change the Fourth Amendment answer as the social meaning changes,
how can police officers know when that will occur?
These challenges may not be insurmountable. Perhaps courts could
hammer out rules for applying the Fourth Amendment to each of these types
of records. Perhaps the answers would change only gradually and courts
could keep up reasonably well. But at the same time, it is important to see
that creating these doctrines would in fact pose a major practical challenge.
All but a few critics have ignored this. As far as I know, only Professor Slo-
bogin has attempted to offer a comprehensive alternative to the third-party
doctrine."4 Professor Henderson has offered a nine-factor totality-of-the-
circumstances test,"5 but the factors and their application are so vague that
they offer no clarity ex ante.' 16 If critics want to replace the third-party doc-
trine with an alternative, they should be clearer about what that alternative
would be and how it would apply in the wide range of cases courts regularly
confront.
112. I have developed this argument in greater depth in Kerr, supra note 92, at 871-75.
113. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (Supp. V 2005) (defining trap-and-trace devices for
purposes of the Pen Register statute).
114. SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 179-96. I critique Professor Slobogin's proposal elsewhere in
this Volume of the Michigan Law Review. Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?,
107 MiCH. L. REV. (forthcoming April 2009) (reviewing SLOBOGIN, supra note 5).
115. Henderson, supra note 5.
116. Professor Henderson's nine factors are (1) the purpose of the disclosure, (2) the personal
nature of the information, (3) the amount of information, (4) the expectations of the disclosing party,
(5) the understanding of the third party, (6) positive law guarantees of confidentiality, (7) govem-
ment need, (8) personal recollections, and (9) changing social norms and technologies. Id. at 975.
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IV. RESPONDING TO CRITICISMS OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
The third-party doctrine is no panacea. Section I.B explained that the
many critics of the third-party doctrine have made two primary arguments
against it, one doctrinal and the other functional. The doctrinal claim is that
the Justices are wrong when they contend that a person does not retain a
reasonable expectation of privacy. According to these critics, people will
often reasonably expect privacy in their third-party information." 7 The
Justices misunderstand privacy because they fail to realize the difference
between exposure to one person and exposure to the public.' 8 The second
argument, the functional claim, is that the third-party doctrine is incorrect
because it gives the government too much power. It gives the police carte
blanche power to access business records, and the prospect of abuses makes
such powers inconsistent with a free society and therefore with the Fourth
Amendment.'9
This Part argues that while both criticisms have some force, both con-
siderably overstate the case and ignore important counterarguments. First,
the doctrinal argument ends up being mostly about form rather than sub-
stance. Although critics are right that the Court's applications of the Katz
test to undercover agents and third-party records are awkward, that is largely
because the third-party cases are better understood as consent cases. Disclo-
sure to third parties eliminates protection because it implies consent. When
the cases are understood as a subset of consent law rather than as applica-
tions of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the doctrinal criticism
ends up being much narrower than critics suggest.
The functional arguments about government power correctly note that
the third-party doctrine permits invasive practices that could be abused by
overzealous and even corrupt officials. However, they overlook the legal
system's many substitutes for Fourth Amendment protection. In the absence
of Fourth Amendment regulation, all three branches have created limits on
the use of secret agents and access to business records that address many of
the critics' concerns. Common law privileges, entrapment law, the Massiah
doctrine, First Amendment doctrine, and statutory privacy protections have
been designed specifically to address concerns of police harassment in the
use of third parties."O Although the critics are justified in fearing abuses,
they have wrongly viewed the Fourth Amendment in isolation. The full
panoply of legal responses to third-party records and secret agents reveals
that Fourth Amendment protection is only one among many legal tools to
address these concerns. As a result, the functional argument against the
third-party doctrine is significantly weaker than the critics imagine.
117. See supra Section I.B. I.
118. See supra Section I.B.1.
119. See supra Section I.B.2.
120. All of these doctrines are discussed infra Part IV.
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A. The Third-Party Doctrine as a Consent Doctrine
First consider the doctrinal criticism that the Supreme Court is incorrect
when it says that individuals cannot retain a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in third-party information. In my view, the doctrinal critics are partially
right. The Supreme Court's applications of the reasonable expectation of
privacy test to third-party information have been awkward and unconvinc-
ing. But the reason is that the third-party doctrine is better understood as a
form of consent rather than as an application of Katz. Third-party disclosure
eliminates privacy because the target voluntarily consents to the disclosure,
not because the target's use of a third party waives a reasonable expectation
of privacy. The difference is subtle but conceptually important, and I think it
reveals that the doctrinal critique is a significantly narrower claim than crit-
ics believe.'
The notion of treating the third-party doctrine as a consent problem ar-
guably goes back to the briefing of Hoffa v. United States ' in 1966, the year
before Katz. Hoffa's merits brief before the Supreme Court argued that the
deception by a secret agent, Partin, had vitiated Hoffa's consent. Hoffa had
been tricked, and his consent to let Partin listen in was no longer legally
valid: "The Government's deception in hiding the informer under his [un-
ion] roles ... prevented any intelligent and understanding waiver of
Petitioner Hoffa's Fourth Amendment rights."'23 The government's brief re-
sponded that Partin's motive had not invalidated the consent: Hoffa had
knowingly and intentionally admitted Partin into his private spaces and had
shared evidence of his crime with Partin.' 24 Having consented to Partin's• 125
presence, Hoffa had waived any Fourth Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court should have accepted this consent-based formula-
tion of the third-party doctrine. The parties in Hoffa accurately identified the
issue raised by the third-party doctrine: When does a person's choice to dis-
close information to a third party constitute consent to a search? Further, the
result in Hoffa sided with the correct answer: So long as a person knows that
they are disclosing information to a third party, their choice to do so is vol-
untary and the consent valid. The fact that a person turns out to be an
undercover agent should be irrelevant to whether the consent is valid, as that
representation is merely fraud in the inducement rather than fraud in the
factum.126 A person who knowingly discloses information to a third party
121. A second response is that many critics wrongly assume that a probabilistic model of the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test is the only correct one. This is not true, as I have argued
elsewhere. See Kerr, supra note 100.
122. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
123. Brief for Petitioners at 35-36, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (Nos. 32, 33,
34, 35).
124. Brief for the United States at 125-26, Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293 (Nos. 32, 33, 34, 35).
125. Id.
126. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1079 (3d ed. 1982).
Perkins and Boyce note:
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may be tricked as to what the third party will do with the information. But
trickery as to motive or design does not vitiate consent.
27
How did the Supreme Court get off course? The critical juncture was
United States v. White, 2 the first third-party case to follow Katz. In that
case, Justice White tried to fit the third-party doctrine into the Court's post-
Katz Fourth Amendment, but he simply chose the wrong doctrinal prong.
Instead of grounding the doctrine in consent principles, he reasoned that use
of a secret agent did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
difference between the two is subtle: If government conduct does not violate
a reasonable expectation of privacy, it is not a search, 1 9 whereas if it violates
a reasonable expectation of privacy pursuant to consent, it is a search but
one that is constitutionally reasonable. 30 At the same time, the two cover
conceptually distinct ground. The reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry
focuses on whether the government conduct intruded into constitutionally
protected areas, whereas consent asks whether it did so with permission. 1
2
Later cases adopted Justice White's framework uncritically, establishing
the third-party doctrine as an application of the Katz test. 33 But this doc-
trinal home never fit. Sharing space with others does not eliminate Fourth
Amendment protection: The police need a warrant to enter a shared home
just as much as they do an unshared one.134 If two people share a home or an
office, they still retain a constitutional reasonable expectation of privacy
there. 35 Sharing space provides the co-occupant with common authority to
permit their consent, 1 6 but it does not relinquish all Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. Similarly, the third-party doctrine is best understood as a shared
space doctrine. By knowingly disclosing information to a third party, an
individual consents to another person having control over it. The doctrine
The general rule is that if deception causes a misunderstanding as to the fact itself (fraud in the
factum) there is no legally-recognized consent because what happened is not that for which
consent was given; whereas consent induced by fraud is as effective as any other consent... if
the deception relates not to the thing done but merely to some collateral matter (fraud in the
inducement).
Id.
127. See id. at 1075-84.
128. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
129. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
130. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 114-15 (2006).
131. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (citing Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961)).
132. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114-15.
133. See supra Section l.B.
134. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (holding that a person retains a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a shared office).
135. Id. at 369-70.
136. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (noting that "common au-
thority" over spaces or property gives co-inhabitants the right to permit inspections of their own
accord).
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sounds in consent, not reasonable expectations of privacy, and it fits within
the rest of Fourth Amendment law when so understood.
3 7
Importantly, while this point narrows the scope of the doctrinal critique,
it does not eliminate it entirely. In particular, it does not address cases like
Miller where the government forces a third party to disclose records after
the suspect voluntarily discloses the record to the third party. The suspect
has consented to third-party access in such cases, but neither he nor the third
party has consented to the subsequent government access. This is a fair
point. But I think it is also a narrow one, as at this point the third-party doc-
trine becomes merely an application of the general rule that the Fourth
Amendment does not regulate subpoenas to testify. 38 Any witness can be
compelled to testify about what he knows and what he has seen without
Fourth Amendment oversight," and the third-party doctrine merely refrains
from carving out an exception to this rule for confidential disclosures to
third parties.
B. Alternatives to Fourth Amendment Protections to Prevent
Harassment-The Case of Secret Agents
The second major criticism of the third-party doctrine is that it gives the
police too much power.140 The doctrine permits government officials to send
in spies, use informants, get bank records, record numbers dialed, and ob-
tain billing records of entirely innocent people without any cause or court-
order requirement. According to critics, giving the government this much
power is inconsistent with a free and open society; the risk of misuse and
harassment is too great.
4
'
The problem with this argument is that it assumes the Fourth Amend-
ment is the only game in town. In truth, a wide range of tools exists for
addressing police harassment of third-party information outside the Fourth
Amendment. These tools substitute for Fourth Amendment protection, pro-
hibiting or limiting access to third-party evidence in specific settings that
may be subject to abuse. In the case of secret agents, the legal system uses
entrapment law, the Massiah doctrine, the First Amendment, and internal
regulations to limit the government's use of secret agents.
To be clear, there is considerable room for debate on the sufficiency of
these substitutes for Fourth Amendment protection. The warrant require-
ment is strong medicine, and some of the nonconstitutional substitutes are
modest by comparison. Most are designed to deter bad faith investigations
137. Notably, Professor Colb has argued that the Supreme Court's "knowing exposure" cases
should be reanalyzed under consent principles. See Colb, supra note 67, at 123. However, Professor
Colb does not focus this insight on the third-party doctrine cases specifically. Further, she does not
suggest that the consent doctrine might help justify the existing third-party doctrine cases.
138. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973).
139. See id. at 10.
140. See supra Section II.B.2.
141. See supra Section Il.B.2.
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rather than to keep the government from accessing information altogether,
and observers may disagree on which doctrines succeed or fail. But this
should not obscure the deeper point: Fourth Amendment protection is only
one tool among several for addressing police harassment. The absence of
Fourth Amendment protection does not mean police practices go unregu-
lated. Rather, it means a shift from regulation through a probable cause
warrant requirement to regulation through privileges, entrapment doctrine,
the Sixth Amendment, the First Amendment, statutes, and other forms of
third-party protection.
In short, critics suffer from constitutional myopia. While they focus on
the failure of the Fourth Amendment to stop government harassment and
limit the power of the state, they tend to overlook the substitutes that already
address the same concerns through other means. Properly conceived, the
choice is not between Fourth Amendment protection and none, but rather
between regulation by a diverse set of doctrines or that diverse set of doc-
trines plus the added protection of the Fourth Amendment. As a result,
critics overstate the degree of government power that the third-party doc-
trine authorizes.
We can begin by considering how the law outside the Fourth Amend-
ment tries to regulate secret agents. Although the Fourth Amendment does
not regulate the use of secret agents,142 four other bodies of law help fill in
the gap: entrapment law; the Massiah doctrine; the First Amendment; and
internal agency regulations. All four bodies of law deter abuses of secret
agents. They prohibit the use of secret agents in some cases and ensure that
they are used only in relatively limited ways in others.
1. Entrapment Law
Entrapment law provides the first substitute for Fourth Amendment
regulation of secret agents. Entrapment is a judicially created doctrine,1 43
recognized by statute in some states, 4 that regulates how the police use se-
cret agents. Although there are several forms of entrapment law, the
overarching purpose of the doctrine is to impose a requirement of reason-
able police practices in the use of secret agents. If the police target an
innocent person, one who has shown no predisposition to commit an of-
fense, the undercover officer cannot induce the target into committing a
crime. 45 "Inducement" occurs when the undercover agent pressures the sus-
pect to commit the offense, either by badgering him or encouraging him to
commit the offense in a way calculated to persuade the suspect based on his
personality. 46 The remedy is an affirmative defense to prosecution rather
142. See supra Section I.A.1.
143. See 2 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5.1(b) (3d ed. 2007).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
146. United States v. Gendron, 18 E3d 955, 961-62 (1st Cir. 1994). Examples listed by then-
Judge Breyer in Gendron include cases in which the secret agent (1) used intimidation and threats
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than the suppression of evidence, meaning that the reasonableness of the
government's conduct is evaluated by a jury instead of a judge.
Entrapment law does directly what critics of the third-party doctrine
want done indirectly: It regulates abusive law enforcement practices target-
ing innocent defendants who are not actually suspected of a crime. The
basic concern animating entrapment law is much the same as the concern
animating the functional critique of the third-party doctrine: "The crucial
question ... is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case
falls below standards . . . for the proper use of governmental power.' ' 47 But
instead of regulating the use of undercover investigations ex ante, entrap-
ment law prohibits their abuse in practice ex post. Instead of regulating
when secret agents can be used, it regulates how they are used. The princi-
ples of entrapment law monitor the government's conduct, giving the jury a
basis to acquit a defendant if the government implants the idea of the crime
in the suspect's mind.
If the Fourth Amendment regulated secret agents, entrapment law would
not be necessary. In such a world, the government would only use secret
agents when it had probable cause that the suspect would reveal evidence of
a crime, and that evidence would prove predisposition to defeat an entrap-
ment defense.148 Entrapment law has evolved as a byproduct of the third-
party doctrine; it was created by the courts to fill in gaps that the third-party
doctrine leaves open.
2. The Massiah Doctrine
The second substitute for Fourth Amendment regulation of secret agents
is the Massiah doctrine. In Massiah v. United States, 49 the Supreme Court
held that an agent of the government cannot question a person who has been
charged with a crime. 50 Massiah had been indicted on drug charges, retained
a lawyer, and was released on bail. Massiah later met with his co-
conspirator Colson, and discussed his drug crimes with Colson when in
Colson's car.'' Unbeknownst to Massiah, Colson had flipped and was acting
against a defendant's family; (2) called every day, began threatening the defendant, and was bellig-
erent; (3) engaged in forceful solicitation and dogged insistence until defendant capitulated;
(4) played upon defendant's sympathy for informant's common narcotics experience and withdrawal
symptoms; (5) played upon sentiment of one former war buddy for another to get liquor (during
prohibition); (6) used repeated suggestions which succeeded only when defendant had lost his job
and needed money for his family's food and rent; and (7) told defendant that she (the agent) was
suicidal and in desperate need of money.
147. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
148. If the government cannot use a secret agent without probable cause to believe that the
agent will uncover evidence of crime from the target, presumably that means that the government
has prior evidence that the target is predisposed to engage in criminal activity.
149. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
150. Id. at 207 ("[W]e hold.., that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by
federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the
prosecution as evidence against him at his trial.").
151. ld. at 202-03.
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as an informant for the government. Agents had bugged Colson's car and
directed Colson to discuss his crimes with Massiah. An agent named
Murphy listened in on the conversation and heard Massiah's incriminating
statements. 52 At trial, Murphy testified about what he heard over Massiah's
objection. When the Massiah case reached the Supreme Court, Massiah ar-
gued that the secret surveillance violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments.'53
The Supreme Court ruled that this use of a secret agent had violated
Massiah's Sixth Amendment rights.5 4 First, the Court held for the first time
that a person who has been indicted and is represented by counsel has a
right not to be questioned by an agent of the state outside the presence of his
attorney.'55 Second, the Court held that the fact that the "agent" was a confi-
dential informant made no difference. 56 Indeed, the fact that Massiah had
been questioned by a confidential informant instead of a uniformed police
officer made the violation of his rights more egregious: "'Massiah was more
seriously imposed upon.., because he did not even know that he was under
interrogation by a government agent.' 5"
The Massiah doctrine regulates the use of third parties at the opposite
end of the investigative process from entrapment law. Entrapment law con-
cerns itself with how the government approaches suspects on the front end
of investigations: The government cannot use third parties to create crime
that otherwise would not have occurred. The Massiah doctrine concerns
itself with how the government approaches suspects near the end of the
process: Under Massiah, the government cannot use secret agents to obtain
information about the crime from a target who has already been charged.
While the Fourth Amendment permits the use of secret agents generally, the
Massiah doctrine carves out one potentially abusive consequence of this rule
by prohibiting the practice after a person has been represented by counsel.s'
3. The First Amendment
The First Amendment may also impose restrictions on the use of under-
cover operations. Generally speaking, the First Amendment is implicated
when government investigators infiltrate groups that engage in First
152. Id.
153. Id. at 203-04.
154. Id. at 205-06.
155. Id. at 207.
156. Id. at 206.
157. Id. at 206 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72-73
(2d Cir. 1962) (Hays, J., dissenting)).
158. This is true so long as the secret agent asks about the crime charged; the Sixth Amend-
ment does not prohibit inquiries about unrelated crimes. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172-74
(2001).
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Amendment activities without a good faith reason for doing so.'9 This good
faith test addresses one result that critics of the third-party doctrine fear the
Fourth Amendment allows: investigations that are designed to target indi-
viduals exercising their First Amendment rights.
United States v. Mayer'6° offers a recent example. In Mayer, an under-
cover FBI agent infiltrated the North American Man/Boy Love Association
("NAMBLA"): a group that claimed to be "'a political, civil rights and edu-
cational organization' opposed to age-of-consent laws.' After becoming
an active member of the group, the undercover agent encountered several
discussions of illegal activity. One group member named Mayer expressed
in frustration that "NAMBLA kept up pretenses of trying to change society
when in fact its members only wanted to travel to meet boys."'' 62 The under-
cover agent then arranged a trip for NAMBLA members to meet boys, and
Mayer signed up to go on the trip. When Mayer was arrested for traveling in
interstate commerce with intent to engage in illegal sexual activities, he
claimed that the government's infiltration of NAMBLA violated the First
Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit explained that use of a secret agent to infiltrate a First
Amendment-related group is permitted only when it is "justified by a le-
gitimate law enforcement purpose that outweighs any harm to First
Amendment interests."'63 The court found that this requirement was satis-
fied, under the circumstances, by reports of illegal activity the police had
received relating to members of the NAMBLA group: Given the facts, the
government's "interests in pursuing legitimate law enforcement objectives
outweighed any harm to First Amendment interests."' 64 Had the undercover
investigation lacked a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or been under-
taken to abridge First Amendment freedoms, then the investigation would
have violated the First Amendment even though it did not implicate the
Fourth Amendment.
4. Internal Agency Regulations
Internal agency regulations provide a fourth tool for limiting the use of
secret agents. At the federal level, for example, the Justice Department has
promulgated the Attorney General's Guidelines on Federal Bureau of
159. Cf NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (invalidating a pro-
duction order for members of the local NAACP on the ground "that the production order, in the
respects here drawn in question, must be regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial re-
straint upon the exercise by petitioner's members of their right to freedom of association").
160. 503 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 2007).
161. Id. at745.
162. Id. at 747.
163. Id. at 753.
164. Id.
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Investigation Undercover Operations.165 The Guidelines require the Special
Agent in Charge of each FBI office to preapprove every FBI undercover
investigation based on a written determination, supported by specific facts,
that the proposed operation will be effective and will be conducted in a
minimally intrusive way.166 Undercover operations can be approved for up to
six months and renewed for one more six month period. 167 They ordinarily
cannot involve expenditures of more than $50,000.'6
The Guidelines have special rules for particularly sensitive undercover
investigations. FBI Headquarters must preapprove investigations of political
organizations, religious groups, the news media, or public officials."9 A
Criminal Undercover Operations Review Committee consisting of FBI and
DOJ officials meets to review these applications, and it must reach a con-
sensus as to the appropriateness of each application. 7 If the Committee
recommends approval of an application, it must include a statement as to
why the operation merits approval in light of the sensitive nature of such
investigations. 7' The Justice Department has promulgated roughly analo-
gous guidelines for the use of confidential informants.'72 Like the limitations
imposed by entrapment law, Massiah, and the First Amendment, these
agency rules attempt to foreclose use of secret agents in bad faith or abusive
contexts.
C. Substitutes for Fourth Amendment Protection
in Business Record Cases
Just as several legal tools regulate the use of secret agents, there are
many substitutes for Fourth Amendment protection of business records. The
three legal tools that predominate are statutory protections, common law
privileges, and rights of the third parties themselves. These doctrines regu-
late the government's access to business records outside the Fourth
Amendment, deterring the kinds of abuses that critics fear may come to pass
under the third-party doctrine. In some instances these tools require court
orders or special cause to access third-party records; in other instances they
block access to third-party records altogether. Taken together, these doc-
trines limit considerably the threat that the third-party doctrine poses to civil
liberties. Once again, reasonable minds can differ about whether they do
165. JOHN ASHCROFT, Arr'Y GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
olp/fbiundercover.pdf.
166. Id. at 3-4.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 6.
170. Id. at 8.
171. Id. at 8.
172. See Department of Justice Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants
(Jan. 8, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ciguidelines.htm.
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enough in specific cases. But these doctrines help address the threat to pri-
vacy and individual rights that critics observe when viewing the third-party
doctrine in isolation.
1. Statutory Protections
The most obvious alternatives to constitutional regulation for access to
business records are statutory protections. Statutory privacy laws can impose
a court-order requirement on government evidence collection even if the
Fourth Amendment does not. The result can deter harassment of the inno-
cent by introducing judicial supervision over investigations and effectively
requiring officials to prove a legitimate government interest in the informa-
tion sought.
For example, in response to Smith,173 Congress enacted the Pen Register
and Trap and Trace Devices Statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. 3121-3127.1
74
Smith held that the Fourth Amendment does not limit the use of pen register
devices to determine the numbers dialed from a telephone. 75 However, the
Pen Register statute makes it a crime to install a pen register without a court
order, subject to some exceptions. Obtaining a court order is quite easy un-
der the statute: Investigators need only certify that "the information likely to
be obtained ... is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.' 76 But this
still imposes a good faith test: The law requires an actual ongoing investiga-
tion and a good faith belief in the likelihood that evidence to be obtained is
relevant to that investigation.
Similarly, in response to Miller,77 Congress enacted the Right to
Financial Privacy Act ("RFPA"). 178 RFPA responds to Miller by limiting
government access to "the information contained in the financial records of
any customer from a financial institution"'' where the Fourth Amendment,
thanks to Miller, does not. Under RFPA, the government can obtain such
financial records with a subpoena only if the government has "reason to be-
lieve that the records sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement
inquiry" and the government first provides the suspect with prior notice of
the planned action that gives him an opportunity to move to quash the sub-
180poena.
In some cases, statutory protections for third-party records have been
enacted even absent court decisions. For example, the Health Insurance
173. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
174. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
175. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000).
177. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
178. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006).
179. 12 U.S.C. § 3402.
180. 12 U.S.C. § 3407.
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Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") protects medical records;''
the Privacy Protection Act restricts government access to third-party records
held by newsgathering organizations; 2 the Video Privacy Protection Act
provides special privacy protections for video rental records;'83 the Stored
Communications Act restricts access to email account records;8 and the
Cable Act restricts access to cable account records.'85 These laws all impose
statutory restrictions on access to records that the third-party doctrine leaves
unprotected under the Fourth Amendment.
In many (but not all) of these cases, the statutory privacy laws provide
less protection than would the analogous Fourth Amendment standard of a
probable cause warrant. s6 But that is a good thing rather than a bad one. The
fact that standards are low prevents the end-run around the balance of
Fourth Amendment rules that outsourcing can permit. At the same time, the
standards are substantial enough to make it quite unlikely that the police
would use the investigative powers solely to harass innocent suspects. In the
case of financial records, a suspect could move to quash the subpoena,
which would provide a court audience to hear his complaint of government
overreaching. And in the case of pen registers, the government must first go
to a judge and seek an order, certifying under oath that an ongoing investiga-
tion exists and that the information collected is likely to be relevant. These
intermediate standards deter wrongful abuse while permitting legitimate
investigations. They strike a middle ground not possible under the Fourth
Amendment.
2. Common Law Privileges
Common law privileges provide a second tool for regulating access to
business records. When a suspect has a privileged relationship with a third
party, the third-party records cannot be accessed by the government. As a
practical matter, the privilege trumps the third-party doctrine. It forces the
government to take a hands-off approach to what otherwise might be very
embarrassing information or important evidence of criminal activity.
The most obvious example of a privilege that trumps the third-party doc-
trine is the attorney-client privilege. In the federal system, privileges are
recognized by Federal Rule of Evidence 501: "[T]he privilege of a witness
[or] person ... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
181. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(l)(ii)(A) (2007) (permitting disclosure of medical records pursu-
ant to "[a] court order or court-ordered warrant, or a subpoena or summons issued by a judicial
officer").
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2000).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 2710.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (Supp. V 2005).
185. 47 U.S.C. § 55 1(h).
186. The major exception is the Cable Act, which allows disclosure of cable records only in
very narrow circumstances. Id.
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experience."' 8 7 Under the attorney-client privilege, "[c]onfidential disclo-
sures by a client to an attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance are
privileged."''88 This rule encourages "full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote[s] broader public interests in
the observance of law and administration of justice."'8 9 Evidence collected in
violation of the privilege must be suppressed.9
The attorney-client privilege is not the only privilege recognized by fed-
eral courts. The Supreme Court recognized a psychotherapist-patient
privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond.'9' And although the Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue, lower federal courts have generally recognized a priest-
penitent privilege.9 2 All of these privileges effectively trump the third-party
doctrine in specific settings where outsourcing of crime is particularly
unlikely or there are powerful competing needs beyond evidence collection.
A suspect is unlikely to use his attorney, his priest, or his psychotherapist to
facilitate his crimes, and professional lawyers, clergymen, and psychologists
are unlikely to be willing to participate in advancing a client's criminal
scheme. At the same time, the privilege is needed to permit individuals to
benefit from the advice of their lawyers, priests, and therapists. In these set-
tings, the privilege effectively ameliorates the potential threat of government
abuses raised by the third-party doctrine.
3. The Rights of Third Parties
The final tool for regulating government access to third-party business
records is through the rights of the third parties themselves. In some cases,
third parties in possession of business records may be willing to cooperate
with the police. In many contexts, however, third parties may want to assert
the rights of their customers. Protecting customer privacy is good for busi-
ness, and third-party record holders often have a considerable incentive to
keep the government at bay. An early illustration is the famous amicus brief
that the telephone companies filed in the Supreme Court's first wiretapping
case, Olmstead v. United States.'93 The phone companies urged the Supreme
Court to rule that the government could not wiretap telephone lines.' 94 Such
a rule made good business sense for the telephone companies: It would both
encourage customers to use the telephone and keep the government from
interfering with their networks.
187. FED. R. EvID. 501.
188. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
189. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
190. See United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
191. 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
192. Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 102 n.6 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing cases).
193. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
194. Brief for Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers. Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Nos. 493. 532. 533).
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A more recent example demonstrates how modem third-party providers
can assert the rights of customers despite the third-party doctrine. In 2006,
in the midst of civil litigation on the constitutionality of the Child Online
Protection Act, the Department of Justice issued subpoenas ordering several
search engine companies to disclose user queries for a two-month win-
dow.' 95 DOJ claimed to need this information to determine how internet
users used search engines to obtain pornography, which could then help de-
termine the effectiveness of Internet filters. 96 When Google objected to the
subpoenas, DOJ agreed to a narrower subpoena seeking a million random
queries and all of the searches for a one-week window.197 Google then con-
tinued to object, and moved to quash the subpoenas on the grounds that they
sought information that was irrelevant and that production would be an un-
due burden. Google made the case somewhat creatively, arguing that
"potential for loss of user trust" was a "burden" on Google that should re-
quire the subpoenas to be quashed.' 98
District Court Judge James Ware used these legal principles to fashion a
narrow subpoena that protected the privacy interests of Google users. As
modified by Judge Ware, the subpoena required Google to create a database
that offered a random selection of 50,000 website addresses that could be
accessed through the Google search engine.' 99 Judge Ware raised sua sponte
the question of the privacy interests of Google users-not Fourth Amend-
ment privacy interests, to be clear, but more general privacy interests in the
disclosure of information users had sent to Google in their queries. 200 Judge
Ware noted that search queries could contain personal information, citing
vanity queries or queries for sexually explicit information as examples of
queries that raise privacy concerns.20° And he fashioned a subpoena that
would allow the government to conduct a study on Google's results without
resulting in the disclosure of third-party queries made by users.
In a number of cases, third parties have also successfully asserted First
Amendment interests of users in response to subpoenas allowed under the
Fourth Amendment. For example, in Doe v. Gonzales, a Connecticut
Internet Service Provider successfully argued that the First Amendment af-
forded it a right to disclose service of a National Security Letter for third-
party record information. In another recent subpoena case, a magistrate
judge ruled that a grand jury subpoena for third-party records of book pur-
chases violated the First Amendment by triggering a likely chilling effect on
195. See Declan McCullagh, FAQ: What does the Google subpoena mean?, CNET NEWS, Jan.
20, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1029_3-6029042.html.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 683 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
199. Id. at 688.
200. Id. at 687.
201. Id.
202. 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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purchasing.0 3 In addition, several courts have imposed First Amendment
restrictions on subpoenas for third-party records in the civil context.
I do not argue that third-party business record holders will always assert
these arguments in defense of their customers. Indeed, recent headlines0 5
about how telecommunications providers voluntarily assisted the NSA in
collecting third-party records (quite possibly in violation of statutory pri-
vacy laws) 206 reaffirm that sometimes third-party providers will cooperate
eagerly with the government. But the point is broader. Third-party business
record holders can recognize the advantages of fighting for the privacy
rights of their customers even absent Fourth Amendment protection. The
prospect of resistance from the legal teams of third-party record holders of-
ten creates a substantial deterrence against government overreaching even
when the third-party doctrine does not.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued for a new understanding of the third-party doc-
trine. Critics of the doctrine portray it as a choice between all or nothing,
207between Fourth Amendment protection or no protection at all. In their
view, the third-party doctrine cases "make[] a mockery of the Fourthm . ,.205
Amendment, leaving a constitutional void that is both illogical and in-
consistent with a free society.2°9 This Article has suggested that this widely
held view tells only half the story. The third-party doctrine serves two im-
portant roles: blocking substitution effects that upset the technological
neutrality of Fourth Amendment law and furthering clarity of Fourth
Amendment rules. Further, the effects of the doctrine are much less dire
than critics tend to suggest; the doctrine is only one tool among many for
addressing abuses of third parties.
In short, both the costs and benefits of the third-party doctrine must ac-
count for substitution effects. On the cost side, fears of excessive
government power must be offset by the substitution effects of doctrines like
entrapment, common law privileges, statutory protections, and the Massiah
doctrine. On the benefit side, courts should consider how the substitution
203. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated Aug. 7, 2006, 246 F.R.D. 570, 573
(W.D. Wis. 2007).
204. See generally Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 112 (2007) (exploring the relationship between the First Amendment and criminal proce-
dure).
205. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Deal Close on Wiretap Law, a Top Democrat Tells CNN, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2008, at A13. Of course, by the time this Article is published, this story will be "old
news"!
206. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Civil Liability and the NSA Call Records Program, http:ll
www.orinkerr.com2006/05/12/civil-liability-and-the-nsa-call-records-program (May 12, 2006,
17:00 EST).
207. See supra Section I.B.
208. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 2.7(b), at 736.
209. See supra Section i.B.
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effects of third-party services can upset the traditional balance of Fourth
Amendment rules. A full appreciation of the role of the third-party doctrine
reveals it as much more complicated than critics have claimed. This does not
mean that every application of the doctrine is indisputably correct; there is
room for disagreement in specific cases, especially given the difficulty of
weighing the costs and benefits involved. But when the entire picture is un-
derstood, the third-party doctrine has an important place within a proper
system of criminal procedure rules.
More broadly, the role of the third-party doctrine reveals an all-too-
common blind spot among criminal procedure scholars. Critics have often
focused on powers of the government to harass innocent individuals, and
have looked for ways that the Constitution can block the harassment .2' But
the Justices of the Supreme Court do not have this luxury. They must create
rules that apply for investigations of both the innocent and the guilty in a
world in which the government often cannot distinguish the two at the out-
set. They must look systemically to generate a set of rules that will apply to
both.
From this perspective, the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is
strong medicine-sometimes too strong. True, it deters abuse, but it also
stops legitimate good faith investigations. At the preliminary stages of inves-
tigations, the police must have tools to gather evidence to determine if
probable cause exists; the warrant requirement can then be saved for limit-
ing more invasive practices like searches of homes and packages. While this
removes Fourth Amendment scrutiny from a set of third-party practices, it
tends to do so when the practices are essentially transactional-a matter of
who did what, not what someone was thinking or saying or feeling. Other
sources of privacy law can then fill the gap, deterring against abusive prac-
tices without imposing the high threshold of the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. The result is a system of procedural rules that both
protects the innocent and permits investigations and prosecutions of the
guilty.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has failed miserably at articulating
these principles. When faced with the facts of specific cases, the Court has
reached results that I think are correct. But by lodging the issue incorrectly
in the reasonable expectation of privacy test instead of consent law, the
Court has backed itself into a rhetorical comer and left the doctrine largely
unexplained. The importance of third-party records in new technologies and
the continuing criticisms of the Court's case law suggest that the time has
come for courts and commentators alike to develop a more sophisticated
understanding of the third-party doctrine. The doctrine should be recast
rather than cast aside.
210. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
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